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In November of 2008, the United States elected Barack Obama, a self-
described “mutt”,1 to be its new president.  When Barack Obama was born 
in 1961, six years before the Supreme Court struck down miscegenation 
laws,2 his Caucasian-American mother and Black-African father could not 
have been legally married in several states in this country.  On the same 
night that Californians overwhelmingly voted for a president who views 
himself as a person of color—a member of this country’s historically most 
despised and disadvantaged minority—they denied members of another 
minority group, gays and lesbians, the right to marry.3 
The California vote could reflect differences in attitudes toward the 
particular minority groups, differences in the political power and legitimacy 
accorded the civil rights and gay rights movements, or differences between 
acceptance of minority group members in public versus intimate life.  First 
let us consider possible differences in the public attitudes towards, and the 
political legitimacy of, different minority groups. 
Federal and state anti-discrimination law exists because our society has 
recognized that one’s race, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
age, and disability can negatively influence the opportunities for 
participation in the public sphere of economic and political life.  Stigma, 
 
* B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969; M.S., Columbia University, 1973; Ph.D., Columbia 
University, 1992.  Director, Center for Ethics at Yeshiva University; Edward & Robin Milstein 
Professor of Bioethics, Yeshiva University. 
 1. Barack Obama, President-Elect, Press Conference (Nov. 7, 2008) (explaining that 
save for his older daughter's allergy, the family would have preferred to get "a mutt, like me" 
as a puppy); see also Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama Seeks Speedy Action on Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/08transition.html? 
partner=rssnyt (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). 
 2. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional Virginia's ban on 
interracial marriage). 
 3. Proposition 8 was passed by California voters on November 4, 2008.  See California 
General Election, Voter Information Guide, Proposition 8 Title and Summary, at 
www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/title-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).  For 
Proposition 8 election results, see California Secretary of State, November 4, 2008 State 
Ballot Measures, available at www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/57_65_ballot_ 
measures.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). 
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prejudice, and discrimination affect virtually every facet of the lives of groups 
protected by state and federal anti-discrimination law, but attitudes toward 
and experiences of minority groups are hardly identical.  The struggles of 
African-Americans for formal legal equality and equal opportunity that 
began with the civil rights movement following World War II taught women, 
gays and lesbians, and people with disabilities how to articulate and fight 
for their own rights and needs. 
The rhetoric and demands of the movements share common 
characteristics, but the recognition accorded to the different groups in law 
and in politics still bears notable differences.  Although no one would 
seriously claim that Barack Obama’s election to the presidency signals the 
end of racism, there are strong and powerful laws and norms against racial 
discrimination, unequal treatment, and adverse outcomes based on race.  It 
is virtually unimaginable that an employer could successfully assert that race 
was a bona fide occupational qualification for any job, but employers may 
deny a job to a person who is gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered 
(GLBT) without violating federal anti-discrimination law.  Forty-five years of 
anti-discrimination law have eroded the notion that male and female 
biological differences dictate different roles for women and men, and the 
nation’s police, military, professions, and elected bodies all include 
significant numbers of women.  There is no “undue hardship” defense for 
employers who make hiring decisions based on race or sex, but there is 
such a defense to employment discrimination claims based on disability.4  If 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to end discrimination based on race, creed, 
color, national origin, and sex is the standard for thinking about anti-
discrimination law, we can see that law and social acceptance of formal 
equality for other minorities lags far behind. 
Characteristics such as race and sex have been markers of social 
identity for many reasons.  They have been thought to be readily observable, 
to be biological givens, immutable and not chosen.5  There are no negative 
moral connotations to being male or female, African-American, or 
Caucasian, but the same cannot be said for being gay or lesbian.  The 
recent popularity of the claim that gays are not responsible for their sexual 
orientation because it is genetically-based suggests that their orientation 
would be blameworthy if it was a matter of choice. 
 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 5. Of course, the phenomena of light-skinned African-Americans "passing" for white, the 
development of techniques to change one's sexual characteristics, as well as increased genetic 
knowledge indicating that there is more diversity within members of one racial group than 
there is among people of different racial characteristics only compound the difficulties of 
making sense of racial and sexual categories. 
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Disability shares characteristics with both groups of minorities, but also 
has distinctive features.  Like race and sex, disability is perceived as an 
obviously biological category.  Unlike minority sexual orientation, it is not or 
no longer seen as a moral flaw or symptomatic of moral flaws.  Like sexual 
orientation, however, one may not be “born with” it, and one’s classification 
as having a disability, like one’s classification as gay or straight, could 
change more than once over a lifetime.  Someone who cannot hear, walk, 
speak, or see may be readily marked as disabled in personal interaction.  
People who cannot hear, walk, speak, or see may feel commonality with 
American blacks or women who must manage an employer’s surprise and 
awkwardness when they show up to interview for executive jobs.  Someone 
with epilepsy, diabetes, dyslexia, or bipolar disorder, however, may be as 
closeted as members of the GLBT world have been.  Media take note of 
how politicians vote on welfare reform, affirmative action, partial birth 
abortion, or same-sex marriage, but neither the media nor political 
candidates expect that the millions of men and women with disabilities of all 
ages, sexual orientations, religions, and races constitute a disability 
community, or vote based on someone’s stance on disability issues.  And in 
fact, it is hard to think of an issue of great importance to the disability rights 
movement that has made headlines since the signing in 1990 of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).6 
Notwithstanding the public’s and the elite’s relative unfamiliarity with the 
notion of people with disabilities as a minority, the ADA clearly recognizes 
that tens of millions of people in the United States experience discrimination 
in employment, government programs, and public accommodations.  The 
ADA embodied the understanding of disability articulated by disability rights 
activists, scholars, and legal advocates for decades: that lack of education, 
unemployment, and societal marginality stemmed not from anything 
inherent in physiologic, sensory, cognitive, and psychological impairment, 
but rather from the interaction of impairment with a society uncomfortable 
with, and not accepting of, people with impairments.7  Thanks to laws such 
 
 6. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000). 
 7. For an early exposition of such a view from a legal scholar, see Jacobus tenBroek, 
The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL.  L.  REV.  841 (1966).  
Early academic writing articulating a social analysis of life as a person with a disability can be 
found in VICTOR FINKELSTEIN, ATTITUDES AND DISABLED PEOPLE: ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION (1980); 
JOHN GLIEDMAN & WILLIAM ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN 
AMERICA (1980); Harlan Hahn, Paternalism and Public Policy, SOC'Y, Mar. 1983, at 36, 36.  
An early federal analysis with an explicitly civil rights approach can be found in U.S. COMM’N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983).  An important 
collection of essays on disability can be found in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita 
Silvers eds., 2000). 
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as the ADA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, more 
children with disabilities go to school and college with non-disabled 
students.8  Non-disabled people now see people with Down syndrome and 
cerebral palsy going shopping and sitting in restaurants, and they know 
them as neighbors, classmates, and coworkers.  However, despite legal 
change and some public awareness of a disability rights movement, activists 
and observers would say that people with disabilities have not won anything 
like the public legitimacy or the political recognition that racial or sexual 
orientation minorities have achieved.9 
The California vote to deny gays and lesbians the right to marry also 
reflects complex and subtle differences in how people understand the 
spheres of public and private life.  Whereas law can be a powerful means of 
changing practices and institutions in the public sphere, it has not been 
considered an appropriate tool for changing patterns of intimacy in 
marriage or family life.10  A state may not bar people from choosing to 
marry on the basis of race, but courts will not uphold a discrimination claim 
from a person who believes that she was rejected for a date because of her 
race.  The United States Supreme Court has determined that the “right to 
procreate” is fundamental and cannot be withheld because of a criminal 
record,11 but no law can compel someone to become a genetic or adoptive 
parent against their will, and no law precludes parents from trying to 
exercise choice and control over some characteristics of children they raise.  
Employers may no longer classify jobs as “male” or “female,” but adopting 
parents may reject an available child based on its sex, race, age, or 
disability.  Similarly, individuals are free to select their procreative partners 
or use various reproductive technologies to increase their chances of having 
a child who might be deaf, or female, or who might not have cystic 
fibrosis.12 
 
 8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000); 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000). 
 9. For a trenchant account of public, media, and political hostility to viewing disability as 
a civil rights and political issue, see generally MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT 
EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE, AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS (2003). 
 10. Kenneth L. Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (analyzing 
what differentiates intimate from more public associations).  A provocative article by Elizabeth 
F. Emens suggests that the state could take certain steps to remove barriers to romantic and 
marital relationships that might actually give people more choice in deciding whom to date 
and marry.  Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, HARVARD L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author). 
 11. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). 
 12. For discussions of protections of the preferences of adoptive parents, see references 
cited in Emens, supra note 10.  See also MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADOPTION AND ETHICS VOLUME 
1: THE ROLE OF RACE, CULTURE, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN IN ADOPTION (2000); MADELYN 
FREUNDLICH, ADOPTION AND ETHICS VOLUME 2: THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION (2000). 
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In this Foreword I cannot develop a much-needed discussion of the 
reasons for and against distinguishing marriage and parent-child 
relationships from the more public ones of employer-employee or leader 
and citizen; nor can I develop points I have made elsewhere that mate 
selection and parental selection differ from one another in significant 
ways.13  Instead I will try to place the articles that follow in the context of 
people with disabilities as a group different from and similar to the other 
groups protected by state and federal anti-discrimination law.  Like people 
of color and gays and lesbians, people with disabilities experience 
disadvantage in both public and private life.  The contributions that follow 
must be understood as examining how attitudes and practices influence 
public decisions about medical care, as well as more private decisions 
about whether children or adults with disabilities will be accepted as 
legitimate members of families. 
THE ARTICLES 
The articles collected in this Symposium on disability, reproduction, and 
parenting clearly demonstrate the complexity of fitting disability into the 
typical framework of minority group analysis in either public or private facets 
of life.  When, if ever, is it appropriate to disaggregate the category of 
“people with disabilities” into sub-groups based on a particular impairment?  
When does health status, in and of itself, adversely affect one’s life, quite 
apart from society’s treatment of people with departures from species-
typicality?  Is it legitimate for health professionals, prospective parents, or 
social agencies to consider existing or future disability when they determine 
which patients they will treat, which adults will become parents, or which 
children they will create and raise? 
The article by Elizabeth Pendo fits most neatly into a minority group 
analysis of disability, with its focus on unequal treatment in a public realm: 
access to a physician’s office or to its medical equipment.14  Pendo points 
out that since the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,15 people with disabilities have 
been entitled to access to programs receiving federal financial assistance.16  
Hospitals, clinics, and private physicians accepting Medicaid, Medicare, and 
any other federal funds have thus been obliged to be accessible to and 
useable by people with disabilities for more than thirty years.  Yet neither the 
 
 13. Adrienne Asch & David Wasserman, Where Is the Sin in Synecdoche?: Prenatal 
Testing and the Parent-Child Relationship, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE: GENETIC 
TESTING, HEALTH CARE, AND DISABILITY 172 passim (David Wasserman et al. eds., 2005). 
 14. Elizabeth Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA 
to Provide Meaningful Access, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 15 (2008). 
 15. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000). 
 16. Pendo, supra note 14, at 30. 
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existence of the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA—covering places of public 
accommodation without regard to federal funding—has ended the unequal 
access to medical care experienced by people with mobility impairments.  
Pendo notes that “[t]he problem of physical barriers to the delivery of health 
care for people with disabilities is a surprisingly under-examined 
subject . . .  Although the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA require that health 
care programs, institutions, and offices be accessible, few actually are”.17  
She meticulously and exhaustively documents the magnitude of the problem 
as well as the adverse health effects of inadequate or delayed tests and 
procedures. 
The medical profession excuses the persistence of inaccessible physician 
offices, examining tables, and mammography machines by saying that there 
is no consensus on the definition of accessible equipment; that accessible 
equipment is not available; and that accessible equipment is not necessary 
because patients can be lifted onto existing equipment.18  Pendo rejects 
these contentions.  She suggests instead that the inattention to the 
gynecological and reproductive health needs of women with mobility 
impairments stems from the pervasive belief that these women are unlikely 
to have sexual partners and that, in any event, they should not be mothers.19  
Pendo concludes her article by proposing ways that federal programs could 
go some way to removing the physical obstacles to health care.20  But no 
matter how welcome and effective her remedies would be for preserving the 
physical well-being of this group of patients, accessible equipment alone will 
not repair the profound attack on a woman’s humanity and sense of self if 
her physician behaves as though the inability to walk precluded the inability 
to love and be loved. 
The article by Susan Stefan takes up what Pendo believes is at the heart 
of the neglect of the sexual and reproductive health needs of women with 
disabilities: the belief that a disability—perhaps especially a woman’s 
disability—renders its bearer an inadequate or unacceptable parent.21  
Stefan deals with women who have psychiatric, rather than mobility 
impairments; the women whose situation she explores are already parents, 
often trying to retain or regain relationships with and rights over their 
children.22  Along with Pendo, she faults the non-disabled majority, acting 
through its laws and social service agencies, for compounding the difficulties 
 
 17. Id. at 17-18. 
 18. Id. at Section III. 
 19. Id. at 42-47. 
 20. Id. at 47-55. 
 21. Susan Stefan, Accommodating Families: Using the Americans with Disabilities Act to 
Keep Families Together, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 135, 140 (2008). 
 22. Id. at passim. 
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these women encounter in preserving their place in their children’s lives.23  
Much of her article demonstrates why the ADA’s framework has not been 
employed successfully in fighting for systemic reforms that would, in her 
view, aid mothers with disabilities and their children. 
Stefan argues that 
[d]espite obvious parallels between family integration and community 
integration, efforts to use the ADA to keep families intact in the community 
when one member of the family has a psychiatric disability have failed 
almost completely. . . .  Despite the fact that a substantial number of 
families who are subject to termination proceedings have at least one 
member with a psychiatric disability, both federal and state courts have 
recoiled from suggestions that the ADA requires state agencies to truly 
modify their practices, services, or training in recognition of this fact, or to 
provide more than cursory accommodations (or, in some cases, any 
accommodations at all) to keep families intact when one member has a 
psychiatric disability. . . .  Instead of case-by-case adjudication, disability 
advocates should bring systemic ADA discrimination cases seeking to 
expose and confront the exclusion and discrimination inherent in the 
operation of the interlocking mental health, social service, and legal 
systems.  Those frameworks, presumptions, and structures essentially erase 
the possibility of keeping the family together, affirmatively undermine family 
integrity, and create barriers, burdens, and obstacles to people with 
psychiatric disabilities remaining with their families. . . .  Asking for 
reasonable accommodations, which requires the agency and court to 
believe that the barriers to successful parenting can be alleviated by 
rearranging certain aspects of service delivery, flies in the face of the 
underlying assumption that the disability itself fundamentally precludes 
parenting at all.24 
Stefan’s extensive documentation of the obstacles these women face 
demonstrates what rehabilitation psychologist Beatrice Wright said nearly 
fifty years ago: that an impairment of one capacity is perceived by others to 
spread to an impairment in all areas.25  Stefan’s words constitute a powerful 
indictment of how committed our courts and social service agencies are to 
creating conditions in which women with disabilities can care for their 
children.   
[F]amily integration . . . is a fundamental component of community 
integration. . . .  [P]ursuing community integration without maintaining 
family integrity is, in some ways, a meaningless concept that perpetuates 
discriminatory images of people with psychiatric disabilities as disconnected 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 138–40. 
 25. BEATRICE A. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DISABILITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH (1960). 
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from intimate relationships and incapable of successful parenting, who can 
never be seen as truly a part of the community.26 
Stefan’s analysis calls to mind psychological and sociological research 
on how low teacher expectations of minority students correlated with their 
decreased academic success.  Surely she demonstrates that current 
institutional arrangements work against a woman with psychiatric disabilities 
ever managing to be a successful mother.  The existing arrangements both 
grow out of a prevailing negative view about the parenting capacities of 
these women and then perpetuate the view by failing to consider their 
parenting needs. 
In faulting physical, legal, and social barriers to reproduction and 
parenting faced by women with very different types of impairments, the 
articles by Pendo and Stefan rest on but do not explicitly address two 
theoretical questions for disability law, disability studies, and bioethics on 
which I will make all-too-brief comment here: are there capacities necessary 
for successful parenting in modern society that could be affected by a 
parent’s disability?; and, is the legal framework available under statutes like 
the ADA the best one for achieving the goals of integration into community 
and family life espoused by the movement for disability rights and equality? 
Turning first to the topic of parenting, we should acknowledge that there 
is probably no truly settled philosophy or law on the essential personal 
qualities or actions of acceptable parents.  What children need at different 
stages in their lives and what their biological, psychological, and social 
relationship should be to their caretakers are still controversial questions.27  
Despite Pendo’s observations about the skeptical attitudes toward parenting 
by women with mobility disabilities, Stefan points to scholarship, law, and 
policy that accepts the childrearing potential of people with a range of 
physical disabilities.28  She seeks to extend the same social and legal 
recognition to those with psychiatric impairments.29  Her views might gain 
their deserved endorsement and implementation were we to achieve 
consensus about the duties and skills we expect of parents, as differentiated 
from the demands of childrearing now carried out by a host of individuals 
 
 26. Stefan, supra note 21, at 140, 141. 
 27. For a useful discussion of the duties of parents, see JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, A Moral Theory 
of Parenthood, in PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY 101, 101-36 (1982). 
 28. In addition to the references cited in Stefan's article, see a forward-looking and 
humane California Supreme Court decision, In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal.  
1979) (holding that “a physical handicap that affects a parent’s ability to participate with his 
children in purely physical activities is not a changed circumstance of sufficient relevance and 
materiality to render it either ‘essential or expedient’ for their welfare that they be taken from 
his custody.”). 
 29. Stefan, supra note 21, at section V B. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] FOREWORD 9 
and institutions in the modern “village”30 of childcare.  Perhaps there are 
some essentials that only a child’s primary caretakers—as opposed to 
grandparents, step-parents, aunts and uncles, teachers, baby-sitters, 
coaches, or counselors—can provide, but Stefan’s work suggests that 
society demands that the parent with a psychiatric disability operate without 
the supports that parents without disability labels take for granted.  In effect, 
more, not less, is demanded in order for someone with an impairment to 
overcome the prejudice against her carrying out her childrearing 
responsibilities. 
Stefan’s proposals point to questions that disability scholars have raised 
about whether any one “model” (medical, social, or minority group) 
adequately addresses the situation of people with disabilities.31  If, as Stefan 
suggests, genuine accommodation of the strengths and limitations of 
mothers with psychiatric disabilities requires that courts and social agencies 
modify expectations, practices, and services, perhaps the ADA’s framework 
of remedying discrimination will not suffice to induce policy-makers and 
bureaucracies to change.32  Stefan’s work is an excellent illustration of the 
insights contained in Scotch and Schriner’s “human variation”33 model of 
disability.  Her argument, like theirs, is that not only physical structures and 
communication barriers, but social and institutional procedures and 
environments need to accommodate the full range of individuals who 
actually inhabit the world; otherwise, no society can be said to be truly 
inclusive of all its members.  Stefan shows how a society that genuinely 
espoused a human variation approach could reform itself so that mothers 
with psychiatric disabilities could provide their children with what love, 
commitment, and skills they possessed, being assured that their children—
like the children of parents without diagnosed impairments— would receive 
support from other individuals and institutions committed to the flourishing 
of families. 
The last three articles in this collection focus on a question quite different 
from how society should deal with its members who have disabilities.  They 
 
 30. See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH 
US (1996). 
 31. For discussions of the value of using several approaches to disability policy, see 
JEROME E. BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1993); Richard K. Scotch & Kay 
Schriner, Disability as Human Variation: Implications for Policy, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 148 (1997); TOM SHAKESPEARE, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2006). 
 32. In my view, the ADA's requirements for making government programs and places of 
public accommodation accessible to people with disabilities could be read broadly enough to 
require the changes Stefan proposes.  My comments about the need to supplement the ADA's 
civil rights framework with a "human variation" approach arises from my recognition that the 
public and many courts and commentators have construed the law more narrowly. 
 33. Scotch & Schriner, supra note 31, at 154-57. 
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consider the emotionally charged, sensitive, and uncomfortable question of 
whether and how reproductive decisions and policies should be influenced 
by the potential for disability.  I use such words as “sensitive,” “emotionally 
charged,” and “uncomfortable” because the topic implicates the politically 
divisive issues of abortion and the moral status of embryos, and the 
historically freighted matter of eugenics. 
Paul Lombardo sets the stage for the perspectives advanced by Janet 
Malek and Judith Daar when he demonstrates how ideas about eugenics 
and evolution have become part of twenty-first century culture wars.34  
Lombardo’s contribution builds on his monumental work aimed at showing 
how bigotry was aided by flawed science in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century United States.35  American science during that time lent 
itself to the goal of eliminating social problems by predicting which people 
were likely to be unfit parents or to produce children with undesirable 
characteristics.  In his article, Lombardo does more than point out that the 
science was wrong and aided hostility to people who were poor, whose 
native language was not English, or who were not Caucasian; he goes on to 
argue that some current opposition to past eugenics or to contemporary 
prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion is being espoused by people who 
are wary of such well-established science as evolution.36  Some of those 
who think of themselves as anti-eugenics are also opposed to many other 
scientific and cultural developments of the past century, and he therefore 
cautions readers to reject any specific practice simply because it is labeled 
“eugenic.”37 
Lombardo’s message nicely frames the articles by Judith Daar and Janet 
Malek.  Their pieces advance a debate about the societal and familial 
implications of the class of reproductive and genetic technologies designed 
to avoid the births of children with disabling traits.  With different emphases 
and argumentative strategies, they each contend that everyone benefits if 
people use embryo screening, prenatal testing, and selective abortion to 
reduce the numbers of people with impairments who are born.  Daar 
examines the place of preimplantation genetic diagnosis not only in debates 
about the meaning of health and disability, but also in the context of 
assisted reproduction more generally.  Malek responds to disability rights 
 
 34. Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57, 72-7 (2008). 
 35. See, e.g., PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND BUCK v. BELL (2008); Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three 
Generations of ??? are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191 (2003); Paul A. Lombardo, 
Facing Carrie Buck, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 1. 
 36. Lombardo, supra note 34. 
 37. Id. at 58. 
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critiques of routine testing.  My comments in this Foreword certainly cannot 
do justice to their contributions.  Let me only highlight how each article 
contributes to the two topics with which I introduced the articles: the 
similarities and differences between the minority category of disability and 
other minority categories, and the differences in accepting people with 
disabilities in public versus family life. 
When we say that someone has an “impairment” or “disability,” we 
indicate that there is a negative departure from a norm expected of human 
beings.38  A woman with cystic fibrosis has more frequent health problems 
and may die sooner than her sister who does not have the condition; a man 
with fragile X syndrome may not develop the intellectual skills for driving a 
car or for pursuing many jobs.  Even in a future society wholly committed to 
inclusion and equal opportunity for people with disabilities, these people 
might be prevented simply by the characteristics of cystic fibrosis or fragile X 
syndrome from undertaking certain activities or playing certain social or 
occupational roles.  And because, even in an imaginable non-discriminatory 
and inclusive society someone with muscular dystrophy may experience 
limitations in the range of life choices that someone who is African-
American will not, it seems sensible, prudent, and perhaps morally required 
to prevent bringing into the world people who are likely to experience these 
limitations.  Supporters of embryonic and fetal testing can agree that many 
problems of people with disabilities stem from unjust social arrangements 
and simultaneously believe that it would be better not to bring people with 
disabilities into the world if their births can be avoided.39 
Judith Daar reviews a range of ethical issues posed by those 
apprehensive about the social implications of using preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis.  She discusses the “spectrum problem” (how serious or mild the 
disability to be prevented, or how early in life it manifests itself), the 
responsibility for health conundrum (does the individual or her parent bear 
responsibility for her health after birth?), and the “expectation problem” (the 
possibility that parents, children, and society will expect that only “perfect” 
children will be born).40  These ethical concerns notwithstanding, Daar 
maintains that “at the end of the day, . . . PGD will make sustainable and 
 
 38. Christopher Boorse, Concepts of Health, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 
359, 359-93 (Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987). 
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FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000); Bonnie Steinbock, Disability, 
Prenatal Testing, and Selective Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 108 (Erik 
Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000); Mary Ann Baily, Why I Had Amniocentesis, in PRENATAL 
TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 64 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000). 
 40. Judith F. Daar, Embryonic Genetics, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 81, 92-117 
(2005). 
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essential progress in advancing human health.”41  In the concluding section 
of her article, she states that “[w]hile worries abound that PGD will promote 
recklessness toward health in children spared of familial diseases, and 
disdain for those who do manifest genetic anomalies, nothing in our past 
treatment of sickness and health suggests such a future.”42  As one 
illustration of her contention that advances in human health can be attained 
without disrespecting people who do not avail themselves of all potential 
health-promoting technologies, she says that there is no discrimination 
against parents who refuse to vaccinate their children, or against the 
unvaccinated children.43  Daar is not alone in her belief that it is possible to 
use PGD and other selection technologies while maintaining a commitment 
to promote societal inclusion of existing people with disabilities,44 but 
Pendo’s and Stefan’s contributions suggest that the society is not as non-
discriminatory as Daar believes it to be. 
Janet Malek also endorses using these technologies and takes on some 
of the arguments that have been leveled against what she calls the “Strong 
Claim,” that “potential parents are morally required to use reproductive 
genetic technologies to reduce the likelihood that their future children will 
have a serious disability when the burdens of doing so are reasonable.”45 
Malek does not deal directly with the ways that existing social practices 
contribute to the difficulties faced by people with disabilities such as fragile X 
syndrome or cystic fibrosis; she simply asserts that they “diminish a future 
child’s ‘capacities for human flourishing’”.46 
The strength of Malek’s article is in her discussion of other disability 
equality-based challenges to the routine use of reproductive genetic 
technologies for preventing disability in future children.  Not surprisingly, as 
a longtime participant in this conversation, I’m not convinced that she fully 
represents or responds to these arguments.47  One can have reservations 
about these technologies and accept many of her points about the 
ambiguity of claiming that any “message” about existing people with 
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 44. I have made a version of a compatibility argument in Adrienne Asch, Disability 
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 45. Janet Malek, Disability and the Duties of Potential Parents, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 119 (2008). 
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disabilities is sent by users of these technologies.48  One can also agree that 
we do not yet have sufficient empirical evidence to claim that there is, or is 
not, a “loss of support” for people with disabilities based on expanded 
interest in these technologies.  As has already been said in this very 
Symposium, one should question how strong the support is for people with 
disabilities in today’s society despite the existence of civil rights protections. 
Malek discusses of the merits and drawbacks of the “parental attitudes” 
argument, that these technologies foster parental reluctance to welcome 
and appreciate a child notwithstanding a trait that leads to foreseeable 
challenges, and her article advances this relatively under-developed strand 
of critiques of reproductive genetic technologies.49  It harkens back to my 
comments earlier about a needed theory of parenting.  What qualities 
should parents have to carry out their responsibilities?  What are their 
responsibilities?  Does moral parenting begin before a child’s birth, even if 
legal parenting does not?  Should prospective parents be required, rather 
than permitted or encouraged, to decide which diagnosable characteristics 
in unimplanted embryos or gestating fetuses preclude their bearers from 
joining a family?  What will be the consequences for privacy and intimacy if 
society, rather than prospective parents, decides which traits are 
unacceptable or too problematic for the community and the family? 
And with these last questions, we see how this Symposium should 
provoke serious reflections about the minority category of disability, the 
differences between disability and other minority categories, and the 
difficulty and dangers of extending laws appropriate to public life to the 
intimacy of family life.  I would like to conclude this commentary by 
reiterating a point that I and others have made in previous writing: family 
intimacy and privacy will be best preserved when the larger society 
welcomes and supports all its members, defining institutions and 
environments that comfortably incorporate the enormous variation in human 
beings.  Archaic, quaint, socialistic, and anachronistic as it may appear, I 
continue to believe that the founding documents and the laws of this nation 
lead us to envision a world in which society will support the parenting 
capacities of women and men and the potential for growth, development, 
and contribution of children.  Disease, disorder, impairment, and disability 
will be understood to be some among many of a person’s characteristics, 
and people will be integrated into society, our communities, and families, as 
unique wholes, not as sets of characteristics.  When people know that the 
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world is welcoming, individuals with and without disabilities will be free to 
take on parenting or to decide that role is not one they want to play.  
Similarly, parents with and without disabilities will be able to decide whether 
their potential for rewarding family life will be unduly compromised by a 
diagnosable characteristic in an embryo or fetus that could become their 
potential child.  Law probably should not make such intimate decisions, but 
it can shape the social world in which intimate decisions are made. 
 
